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Donald Moggridge's biography of John Maynard Keynes is indisputably 
a major contribution to understanding Keynes. Needless to say, it is a 
challenging task to interpret the life of an economist who had great 
talents, diverse interests, a remarkable personality, and such great im-
pact upon economic theory and policy. Certainly few historians of 
thought could hope to begin to capture the variety and depth of Keynes's 
accomplishments ranging across politics, economics, public policy, logic, 
the arts, philosophy, ethics, biography, and history. Moggridge's ability 
to do so derives from his outstanding knowledge and familiarity with 
Keynes's writings, a result of his years of editing the recently completed 
thirty volumes of Keynes's Collected Writings, a process that began more 
than two decades ago in 1969 with Elizabeth Johnson. 
Importantly, however, Moggridge also brings an expertise in inter-
war international economic policy to the subject of Keynes . One might 
well argue that Keynes's historical significance lies in his status as a 
pivotal Liberal Party theoretician of British society and economy after 
World War I. Keynes's economics and policy recommendations would 
thus flow from his vision of how a lost Edwardian world might be 
reconstituted for a larger society, where the freedoms of expression and 
privileges that some had enjoyed were coupled with freedoms from 
hardship and economic insecurity for the many. Moggridge does not 
neglect this side of Keynes's life, but sees Keynes's evolution on a larger 
stage. As a monetary economist in the first half of the century in Britain, 
Keynes saw a national monetary policy become an international mon-
etary policy, and a national economic policy become an international 
economic policy. And, as the only figure closely involved in the epochal 
negotiations of both Versailles and Bretton Woods, Keynes was specially 
positioned to see the shape of the new age that the twentieth century 
was producing. Moggridge is particularly good on this important side 
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of Keynes, and perhaps at his best as a biographer when he tells the 
story of how Keynes in the negotiations for the post-World War II 
international economic system exhausted his last energies in pursuit 
of a world order he had believed necessary decades earlier. This 
was a man of the same talents and character as had studied with C . E. 
Moore and Alfred Marshall in his first years at Cambridge, but a man 
whose vision of the world was far removed from theirs at the end of 
his life. 
Explaining the path of development of Keynes and his mind argu-
ably thus constitute the greatest challenge to biographers and historians 
of his thought. Indeed Keynes's oft-noted willingness to alter past opin-
ions and his general intellectual versatility makes this an especially chal-
lenging aspect of such a task. How, exactly, did Keynes's thinking de-
velop? Of course, the extensive literature on the interpretation of Keynes 
has made the transition from his Treatise on Money to The General Theory 
a standard topic for Keynes scholars - a topic to which Moggridge is a 
noted contributor. In recent years, howeve~ a new debate over Keynes's 
intellectual development has focused upon the transition from the Trea-
tise on Probability and Keynes's early unpublished Apostles papers to the 
philosophical thinking implicit in Keynes's later economics. In light of 
the charge that Keynes's thinking about uncertainty in The General Theory 
was nihilistic (Coddington, 1982), Tony Lawson (1985) initiated a line of 
argument that linked Keynes's thinking about uncertainty to his earlier 
thinking about probability. Since many Keynes interpreters place heavy 
weight on the attention Keynes gave to uncertainty in his later work, 
the philosophical issues raised in the debate are of no little importance. 
Insofar as Moggridge recognizes this, it seems appropriate for a review 
of his book in this journal to concentrate on his handling of the topic of 
Keynes and philosophy. 
To begin, it seems that three different sets of questions concerning 
Keynes's philosophical thinking must be distinguished: first, those con-
cerning the nature and development of Keynes's early ideas from the 
time of his first acquaintance with C. E. Moore's Principia Ethica through 
the time of his writing the Apostles papers and the Treatise on Probability; 
second, those concerning the nature, development, and possibly incom-
plete character of the philosophical thinking associated with Keynes's 
later economics; and third, those concerning the development of 
Keynes's philosophical thinking over the course of his entire lifetime. 
Certainly, too, there are interrelations between these different sets of 
questions, and, as will emerge, it is often difficult to speak about one 
set of issues apart from the others. Moreover, understanding Keynes's 
general intellectual development requires that one integrate Keynes's 
philosophical development with the development in his economic think-
ing. An especially difficult aspect of this latter issue involves assessing 
the importance of Keynes's philosophy in his overall thought, since it 
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can both be argued that philosophy was fundamental to Keynes's think-
ing generally (a view increasingly defended), and also that philosophy 
had little influence on the development of Keynes's economic thinking 
(perhaps the traditional view). 
Moggridge weighs in on the first set of issues concerning Keynes's 
early philosophy by contesting the view (for example, Skidelsky, 1985) 
that one of Keynes's more important (but undated) Apostles papers, 
"Ethics in Relation to Conduct," was written early. Keynes had indicated 
in correspondence after graduation that he was re-reading Moore, in 
order "to write a long criticism of it" (Moggridge, p. 115), and was much 
later, in 1938 after completing The General Theory, to treat his early views 
quite critically in his "My Early Beliefs" memoir (which, Moggridge 
notes, was one of two papers whose publication Keynes explicitly sanc-
tioned in his will). Moggridge thus points out that a natural question to 
ask is, "When did Keynes's beliefs change?" (p. 120). The significance 
attaching to the dating of "Ethics in Relation to Conduct" is due to the 
fact that its themes about the meaning and nature of probability are 
foundational to the argument of the Treatise. Thus, if the paper was 
written early, the "My Early Beliefs" critique could apply to important 
elements of the Treatise, and the book would then not - at least 
straightforwardly - justify Keynes's later thinking about uncertainty in 
The General Theory. Alternatively; if the paper was written fairly late 
among the Apostles papers, as Moggridge believes, it might then be 
argued that the "My Early Beliefs" critique applied only to the earliest 
Apostles papers, and not to "Ethics in Relation to Conduct." The Treatise 
could then be thought relatively free of Keynes's later critique, and 
ultimately still serve as a basis for the analysis of uncertainty in Keynes's 
later economics - an issue Moggridge sees as "whether Keynes remained 
wedded to all of his 1908-21 doctrines concerning the theory of prob-
ability" (p. 144). 
Moggridge thus builds an argument to show that any "break" in 
Keynes's thinking occurred well before the writing of the Treatise. Past 
debate over such a "break" focussed upon Keynes's not unambiguous 
assertion in 1930 that Frank Ramsey had indeed been correct in his 
critique of the main philosophical ideas of the Treatise, but this debate 
had preceded the Coddington nihilism charge and the recent Cambridge 
project of rehabilitating the philosophy of the Treatise. The re-positioning 
of a "break" in Keynes's thinking is closely associated with what has 
come to be known as the "continuity thesis," which either denies or 
deemphasizes significant change in Keynes's philosophical thinking 
sometime after his early explorations of Moore's ideas. Moggridge's 
contribution on the topic is to claSSify the early Apostles papers into 
three groups, and argue that "Ethics in Relation to Conduct" appears 
in the last group, covering the period 1908 and after. A supporting 
argument for his position occurs in his judgment on the debate over 
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Keynes's response to Ramsey, where he repeats his conclusion that "the 
'beliefs' concerned related to the period before substantive work on the 
fellowship dissertation," and agrees with Anna Carabelli (1988) that 
"Keynes 'accepted none of the main points which are characteristic of 
the view of probability advanced by Ramsey in his 1926 article' " (p. 623). 
There are, however, a number of difficulties with this view of 
Keynes's development. First, Keynes bases his logical account of prob-
ability in the Treatise on the idea that we employ intuition to directly 
grasp (indefinable) probability relations, but is then explicit in "My Early 
Beliefs" in saying that one of the most objectionable intellectual practices 
that he and his early friends relied upon was to claim to exercise a "direct 
unanalysable intuition about which it was useless and impossible to 
argue" (Keynes, 1971-89, X, p. 437). This "neo-platonism," as he termed 
it, "combined a dogmatic treatment as to the nature of experience with 
a method of handling it which was extravagantly scholastic" (Ibid ., p. 
438). Second, and relate diy, after Ramsey had criticized the idea that 
we intuit probability relations (' ~I do not perceive them, and ... more-
over I shrewdly suspect that others do nor perceive them either" [Ram-
sey, 1978]), Keynes replied, "I think he is right" (Keynes, 1971-89, X, 
pp. 338-39). Accordingly, though Keynes may well not have adhered 
to any of the subjective probability ideas Ramsey espoused, as Mog-
gridge concludes following Carabelli, he clearly agreed that Ramsey was 
correct in an important criticism of Keynes's own views on the Treatise. 
Together, these two points indicate that the Treatise was not free of 
criticism in Keynes's eyes, at least after 1930. Third, regarding the dating 
of the "Ethics in Relation to Conduct" paper, according to records kept 
of the questions addressed at the meetings of the Apostles by the Society 
itself, the question tackled on January 23, 1904 - the date Skidelsky 
assigns to the paper - was: "Is there an objective probability?" This was 
indeed the topic of the paper. With this dating, then, and given the 
paper's connections to the Treatise, Keynes's critique of his early views 
would also target that work, and it would not be possible to argue that 
the so-called "break" in Keynes's work occurred before 1908. 
Moggridge's contribution on the early works should nonetheless not 
be overlooked. He develops the first systematic dating and organization 
of the papers, he discusses their arguments in some detail, he formulates 
many of the questions concerning Keynes's early development, and he 
incorporates the influence of Moore on Keynes in his account of Keynes's 
intellectual development. The Apostles papers, because of their inac-
cessibility and treatment of a variety of topics, have been difficult for 
scholars to assess. They reflect Keynes's experimentation with ideas, 
some paths later abandoned, and early commitments that persist 
throughout his lifetime (such as Keynes's interest in the balance between 
"being good" and "doing good"). Their future publication will no doubt 
produce further argument about Keynes's early intellectual develop-
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ment. Hopefully, this future discussion will be forced off the unfortunate 
emphasis on "breaks" currently preoccupying the literature on Keynes 
and philosophy, since Keynes surely preserved many of his early views 
while at the same time abandoning others. His philosophical develop-
ment, as that in his economic thinking, operated on a variety of different 
levels, and was apparently a more complex affair than the methodology 
of "breaks" and "continuity" implies. 
Moggridge also advances interesting views about Keynes' s later phil-
osophical thinking (the second set of issues distinguished above), es-
pecially in connection with the difficult concept of intuition. Noting how 
Keynes often returned to the topic of great thinkers' intuitive powers 
(for example, Marshall and Newton), Moggridge describes Keynes's per-
sonal intellectual strategy as one of grasping essentials, typically in ad-
vance of a full-blown analysis, from which he then would flesh out 
models or arguments that delineated premises appropriate to the con-
clusions he thought necessary. This changed intuition from being a form 
of pure insight into the underlying real nature of things in the Platonic 
sense into a sort of human capacity to see what Moggridge characterizes 
as the practical significance of an argument, "its essentially practical 
motivation" (p . 553). It meant that were one's premises and inferences 
found wanting in exchange or debate with others, one searched about 
for new premises and inferences rather than abandon one's 
conclusions - a technique of argument which many of Keynes's col-
leagues and critics found exasperating and even unprincipled, but which 
he felt methodologically justified. For him there was a deeper rationale 
than mere success in argument. Economics was a moral science, not a 
natural science, and this meant that one reasoned in terms of individuals' 
"motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties," while always on 
guard against treating the material at hand as " constant and homoge-
neous" (Keynes, 1971-89, XIV, p. 300). It required that one have a broad 
grasp of history, politics, and public opinion, and reason on many levels 
simultaneously in order to make sense of why people behaved in the 
ways that they did. It meant that an economist with good habits of mind 
could often grasp the truth of a matter before understanding quite why 
it was so. Of course Keynes recognized one might also get things wrong, 
and need to start over. In this way, then, intuition was a more human, 
natural form of cognition than he had originally believed, and formed 
the basis for a quite different view of knowledge and science than he 
had been attached to in his early thinking. 
With this treatment of the later Keynes, then, Moggridge advances 
elements of a theory of Keynes's overall philosophical development. 
Being more attentive to an argument or theory's "practical motivation" 
meant basing one's reasoning upon factors that were characteristically 
social-historical in nature. People were simply not very predictable, and 
understanding their intentions typically involved making sense of their 
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historical circumstances and the range of possible judgments they might 
entertain. In terms of Keynes's thinking in the Treatise, this gave con-
siderable emphasis to the taxonomy of different forms of probability 
judgment (numerically measurable, non-numerically measurable, non-
numerically comparable, non-numerically noncomparable) that made up 
the body of nonconclusive, nondemonstrative arguments, and which 
had arguably been the most creative aspect of the book. Keynes's later 
philosophy, it might thus be argued, still made the topic of judgment 
central, but sacrificed Moorean metaphysics for a new grounding for 
judgment more appropriate to the social sciences. On this view, uncer-
tainty was not an intractable dilemma confronting the decision-maker -
as it might be for a proponent of a more demanding epistemology - but 
a phenomenon structured by the social-historical development of the 
market system that could even be addressed through well-conceived 
policy reform. 
Yet, as Moggridge well captures in the final eight chapters of his 
book, Keynes's involvement in war policy and post-war planning in the 
last years of his life left little time for pitilosophy or even economic 
theory. No doubt a more leisurely late life would have brought forth 
further comment from him on many of the philosophical issues raised 
by his later economics. Rules and conventions, being good and doing 
good, the socialization of investment in relation to semiautonomous 
social-economic organizations - these and other topics could well have 
received Keynes's further attention. Moggridge nonetheless has helped 
to set out a number of the important issues concerning Keynes's phil-
osophical development . It should be emphasized that this is but one of 
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